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Introduction 
The neoclassical economic paradigm is 
now over one hundred years old. Since its 
inception in the 1890s, it has grown to be the 
dominant paradigm in economic theory, building 
its hegemonic power to the exclusion of alternative 
approaches. I have studied and then taught 
economics for nearly twenty-five years now. I had 
come to economics, as an undergraduate student in 
Paris, with a lot of excitement and trepidation: that 
discipline was going to help me understand what 
was going on in the world. I soon found out that 
the neoclassical paradigm, while providing some 
seductive modeling, did not come close to 
answering the questions I had. But it was only 
much later, in graduate school, that other questions 
started coming up. As a woman in the field, I 
started realizing that my own realities were 
missing, that they were dismissed or trivialized 
when issues of women's places in the economy 
were brought up. 
Examining the origins of the neoclassical 
paradigm, one can identify the Victorian ideology 
which is at the roots of the treatment of women 
within it. The founding fathers - Marshall, Pigou, 
Edgeworth, and Jevons - wrote as one in a voice 
laden with patriarchal condescension. 
Unfortunately, this attitude towards women has 
remained virtually the same. Yet, simply 
cataloguing the neoclassical record on the status of 
women seems increasingly fragmentary: giving 
voice, again, to "the big men" could not be the sole 
object of an exploration of the patriarchal bias of 
neoclassical economics. Two other imperatives 
emerged. 
First, to give voice to women, to feminists, 
writing on economic matters, asserting their 
disagreement with the status quo, in society and 
within the profession; and adding to these the 
voices of the few male economists approaching 
"the woman question" with a more sympathetic and 
innovative outlook. 
Second, to go beyond a mere history of 
thought project to challenge the neoclassical 
monolith by rooting the contemporary feminist 
critique in the discipline's own history. This work 
contributes to the development of a feminist 
epistemology and ontology. It poses the questions, 
"who is writing theory? for what purpose?" It also 
challenges the notion that an epistemology based 
on the standpoints of women and other 
marginalized groups' in the capitalist/patriarchal 
system could ever find a place within the 
neoclassical paradigm. 
Such an approach challenges two of the 
main silencings routinely performed within 
modern-day neoclassical economics: the erasure of 
women and feminists both within the paradigm and 
as voices of dissent, and the dismissal of 
methodological critics of the paradigm. I will note 
here that the second erasure is explicit, while the 
first is still implicit only. It is relevant to mention, 
in this respect, that my book (Pujol 1992) has been 
criticized so far, not so much for its feminist stance 
and its challenge of the erasure of women and 
feminists in the discipline, but for daring to criticize 
the neoclassical paradigm, to suggest that it is 
flawed. These flaws can be seen more clearly when 
we analyze the five elements which characterize 
neoclassical views of women: 
1. A l l women are married, or if not yet, 
they will be. Similarly, all women have or will 
have children. 
2. A l l women are (and ought to be) 
economically dependent on a male relative: father 
or husband. 
3. Women are (and ought to be) 
housewives; their reproductive capacities specialize 
them for that function. 
4. Women are unproductive (whether 
absolutely or relative to men is not always clear) in 
the industrial workforce. 
5. Women are irrational, they are unfit as 
economic agents, and they cannot be trusted to 
make the right economic decisions. 
Through all these elements, women are 
constructed as different from the norm (men). A l l 
the above characteristics together contribute to 
rationalizing women's exclusion from the public 
realm of economics: the market. These 
characteristics are seldom openly and clearly stated 
by economists. They fall within what economists 
call "unstated assumptions" (even though there is 
so little awareness of their existence). And because 
they are unstated, it is not entirely easy for women 
in the discipline to put a name on the source of our 
malaise. And I quote here my own inner voice: 
my voice, the "I" I am using here, a scary 
thing to do (there is no I in my book). I 
am doing it because it is necessary for us, 
women/feminist economists to use our 
own voices, to claim the right to do so. As 
Diana Strassmann and Livia Polanyi say, 
in economics: 
direct voices have seldom been 
female voices, seldom been 
voices on the margin, seldom 
been voices not legitimated by 
the mainstream of power and 
control ... until women speak 
their own thoughts and 
experiences in their own voices 
and legitimate their speech by 
the authority of their own 
histories and experiences, we 
will not have a truly feminist 
economics. (Strassmann and 
Polanyi 1992, 13-14) 
Let us remember, as feminist economists, 
that the personal is political and the political is 
economic. As a woman, as a feminist, as a lesbian, 
and as a survivor within the discipline of 
economics, my identity, and the experiences I have 
encountered in this discipline for twenty-five years 
inform my analysis of economic theory.2 
We turn, now, to an examination of the 
work of the early neoclassical economists to show 
how these five unstated assumptions have been 
used consistently,3 and contrast them with the 
actual situation of women and with feminist 
economic analyses of women's situation. 
Women as Married and Dependent 
The first two characterizations, that all 
women are married or are to be married,4 and its 
immediate corollary that they are the economic 
dependents of men, invariably inform neoclassical 
discussions of women's labour force behaviour, and 
beyond that of any economic activity in which they 
might be engaged. This sets the stage for 
questioning women's presence in the labour market 
or for refusing to take this presence seriously. 
Women, being supported, have no reason to be in 
the labour market. The concerns they might have -
particularly for higher wage levels and for access to 
employment - can be and have been dismissed as 
inconsequential. By contrast, men's presence in the 
labour force has never been questioned by 
neoclassical economists.5 
This characterization leads economists to 
see women as non-autonomous agents. For Pigou, 
the main determinant of (all?) women's labour 
supply is their husbands' labour income (Pigou 
1960, 565-6). In modern/Beckerian neoclassical 
economics, women seek employment as the result 
of a "household decision" (Becker 1981). One can 
wonder if, in neoclassical economics, the decision 
to seek employment is an individual decision for 
women. Clearly such an approach allows us to 
avoid asking why women continue to supply their 
labour when their wages are so low; such a 
decision might reflect an individually non-optimal 
use of their productive abilities; and women are not 
allowed by market conditions to optimize returns to 
their human capital investment. 
Women's presence in the labour force is 
not seen as a contribution to economic welfare; it 
is instead problematized as threatening severe 
negative consequences for national welfare and 
"household utility." Edgeworth warned with alarm 
that large numbers of women in the workforce 
would bring a "depression or debacle of industry," 
a "debacle, ultimately ruinous alike to wealth and 
family life" (1922, 436; 1923, 493). Marshall, 
Jevons and Pigou all expressed concern for the 
impact of employment on women's household 
duties and on infant mortality rates (Marshall 1930: 
198, 685; Jevons 1904; Pigou 1960, 187). 
Ironically, the solutions to these 
"problems" proposed by the heretofore "free 
market" economists relied on Draconian 
interventions into existing labour market 
conditions. Marshall supported the Factory Acts 
(1930: 198, 751); Edgeworth argued for the 
maintenance of barriers to women's entry into 
occupations (1923, 490-4). Jevons was more 
severe, advocating legislating the complete 
exclusion of mothers of children under the age of 
three from factories. 
In the same vein, where Pigou advocated 
state intervention to correct market failure in the 
labour market, women were explicitly exempted.6 
Marshall, Pigou and Edgeworth were all either 
against legislating minimum wages for women, or 
against minimum wages set at the same level as 
men's. None of them supported equal pay for equal 
work legislation. These economists' opposition to 
women's employment went hand in hand with their 
support for both preserving men's pri vi leged access 
to employment and an enhanced male pay packet 
such that all men, whether married or not, could 
earn a "family wage" (Edgeworth 1923). Such 
proposals, if implemented, would have removed 
what they saw as the main cause for women's 
labour force participation: their need to earn 
complementary family income. 
We can find direct parallels in the 
contemporary neoclassical treatment of women's 
labour force participation. Since Mincer's (1962) 
seminal article, the focus has been on married 
women's labour supply. The main question has 
been "why are these (married) women in the labour 
force?" and not the appropriate pay scale, working 
conditions or utilization of their human capital 
investments. Hence, (all) women's waged 
employment is constructed as problematic; their 
human capital investment behaviour as anomalous 
(see Mincer 1962; Mincer and Polachek 1974, 
1978; Sandel and Shapiro 1978; Mincer and Ofek 
1979). Thus the New Home Economics is a 
rationale for (all) women's "specialization" in 
reproduction and housework as opposed to income-
earning employment (see Becker 1973,1976,1981; 
Schultz 1974). 
By implicitly generalizing from married 
women to all women, the existence and the needs 
of women who are not attached to men are denied, 
and the "norm" of women's economic dependence 
is ideologically reinforced by both contemporary 
(Mincer, Polachek) and early neoclassical 
economists (Marshall, Pigou, Edgeworth, Jevons). 
One has to look hard to find references to single 
women, or to no-longer-married women, let alone 
to lesbians - of whom economists must never have 
heard.7 
Yet, the actual situation of women differed 
substantially from the view proffered by the 
neoclassical economists. In nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century England, a substantial proportion 
of women were and remained unmarried (Bodichon 
1859, 28), and among those who married, full 
economic support by husbands was often far from 
the more distressing reality (Cadbury et al. 1906; 
Smith 1915; Rathbone 1917, 1924). Women, both 
married and unmarried, were present in the labour 
force in large numbers (Scott and Tilly 1978). 
These facts were reported and documented by 
feminists who often used them as a basis for their 
demands for the means to economic independence 
for women: access to jobs, education, professional 
employment and equal pay (Bodichon 1859: 
Fawcett 1892,1916, 1918; Webb 1914,1919).8The 
so-called "family wage" was described by Eleanor 
Rathbone (1917, 1924) as an inadequate mode of 
support for families, and furthermore, as a 
completely ineffective mode of income 
distribution.9 The issue of the degree to which 
women supported themselves and their dependents 
was hotly debated and the object of contradictory 
empirical claims. 1 0 
Feminist writers who discussed issues of 
women's economic status, in the pages of the 
Economic Journal and elsewhere, provided ample 
documentation and analysis to contradict the 
assumptions and normative reasoning of 
neoclassical economists. Economic historians such 
as Georgiana Hill (1896), Edith Abbott (1910), 
Elizabeth Hutchins (1915), Alice Clark (1968) and 
Ivy Pinchbeck (1981) documented the work and 
economic contributions of women, from the 
Middle Ages to the late nineteenth century. The 
research team of Edward Cadbury, Cecile 
Matheson and George Shann published an 
extensive sociological study of working women in 
1906. The Fabian Women's Group's survey of 
Working Women and Their Dependents in 1915 
(Smith 1915) was corroborated by Hogg's study 
published in Economica in 1921. 
Indeed, these studies documented the 
ongoing productive role of women, married and 
not married, and their contribution to their own 
support, the support of their dependents and to the 
overall economy. In the pages of the Economic 
Journal, Ada Heather-Bigg argued that it was not 
women's work, but their earning of an income, 
which was objectionable to the opponents of 
women's employment. She clearly perceived that 
the overwork of women was of no concern to 
patriarchal ideologues, but their fear of women's 
access to economic independence was, to quote her 
colourful words, "the veriest scooped-out, sheet-
draped turnip that ever made a village dolt take to 
his heels and run" (1894, 55). 
Feminists writing on these issues pointed 
out the necessity of women's employment as a 
source of economic support for themselves and 
others, thereby challenging the "family wage" and 
"pin money" doctrines. They argued and 
empirically demonstrated that there was no such 
thing as universal support of women by men, that 
men's earnings were insufficient to support their 
families, and that women contributed a high 
proportion of subsistence needs out of their meagre 
earnings and hard work. Out of these observations 
arose serious challenges to some of the 
justifications for existing labour market conditions. 
Feminists saw the Factory Acts as 
discriminatory restrictions to women's entry into 
the labour market. They denounced them as 
protecting the "monopoly" of men over some 
occupations (Bodichon 1857; Fawcett 1916, 1918; 
Webb 1914, 1919; M i l l 1965, 1970; Taylor 1970) 
and the license of employers to exploit (Smart 
1892). The "family wage" ideal was also seen as a 
protection of male privilege, of men's right to a job 
and to a pay cheque whether or not they had a 
family to support. Furthermore, it reinforced their 
power in the home (Rathbone 1917,1924).11 Policy 
proposals to exclude women from the labour force 
were denounced by feminists as a means to 
disempower women, to thwart their efforts to 
organize, and as an encouragement to employers to 
exploit them (Smart 1892; Fawcett 1918; Webb 
1919). 
Women as Mothers 
Characterizing all women as married or to 
be married goes along, in the writing of the early 
neoclassical economists, with the third 
characterization of seeing them as mothers whose 
duty is to raise children properly and carry out 
related housework. Any other occupation was seen 
as interfering with this obligation and therefore 
causing major losses in economic and general 
welfare. Marshall maintained that (all) women's 
employment "tempts them to neglect their duty of 
building a true home, and investing their efforts in 
the personal capital of their children's character and 
abilities" and insisted on the necessity of their 
presence in the home (1930: 685, 721). He asserted 
that the "degradation of the working classes varies 
almost uniformly with the amount of rough work 
done by women" and more particularly with 
mothers losing their "tender and unselfish instincts" 
due to "the strain and stress of unfeminine work" 
(1930, 564). 
Pigou advocated shorter workdays for 
women to provide them with "opportunities for 
better care of their homes" (1960, 463). He 
believed that "a woman's work has a special 
personal value in respect of her own children" 
(188) which led him to assign women to the home 
in his blueprint for economic welfare. Jevons 
asserted that "there are no duties which are more 
important in every respect than those which a 
mother is bound by with regard to her own 
children" (1904, 166). He also proclaimed "the 
right of the infant to the mother's breast" (171). 
Women's rights are never mentioned in such 
fashion.12 
Marshall, Pigou, and Jevons' advocacy of 
full-time domesticity for mothers was based 
entirely upon alarmist accounts of high infant 
mortality in districts where women could find 
industrial employment (Jevons 1904,153; Marshall 
1930: 198, 529; Pigou 1960, 187). Other factors 
which might have caused high infant mortality, 
particularly starvation-level wages and the resulting 
unsanitary living conditions in working-class 
households were not investigated. 
In fact, the evidence cited did not support 
the economists' claims regarding the negative 
effects of mothers' employment, but it was 
authoritatively dismissed anyway. Jevons, for 
example, attempted to explain away the case of 
Liverpool, which held "the place of dishonour" 
with the nation's highest infant mortality rate 
although there were no women-employing 
industries in Liverpool! Liverpool was an 
"anomaly" due to its population mix (1904, 153-4). 
In similar fashion, Pigou invoked ceteris paribus 
reasoning in his attempts to dismiss the annoying 
evidence that working mothers provided a remedy 
to poverty and infant mortality: 
The reality of this evil [working mothers' 
alleged neglect] is not disproved by the 
low, and even negative, correlation which 
sometimes is found to exist between the 
factory work of mothers and the rate of 
infant mortality. For in districts where 
women's work of this kind prevails there 
is presumably - and this is the cause of 
women's work - great poverty. This 
poverty, which is injurious to children's 
health, is likely, other things being equal, 
to be greater than elsewhere in families 
where the mother declines factory work, 
and it may be that the evil of the extra 
poverty is greater than that of the factory 
work. This consideration explains the 
statistical facts that are known. They, 
therefore, militate in no way against the 
view that, other things equal the factory 
work of mothers is injurious. (1960, 187) 
Reasoning like this was used effectively to depict 
women who cared for children as criminals. 
Mothers who sought employment "and go earn 
good wages in the mills" (Jevons 1904, 166) along 
with the wet and dry nurses who provided childcare 
for the employed mothers, were held directly 
responsible for the death of children. Curiously, 
these women were not perceived by neoclassical 
economists as economic agents who exercised 
rational decision making under the specific 
constraints they faced. 
Furthermore, working mothers were 
described as acting unnaturally. Jevons compared 
them unfavourably to female animals: "The very 
beasts of the field tend and guard their whelps with 
instinctive affection. It is only human mothers 
which shut their infants up alone, or systematically 
neglect to give them nourishment" (1904, 166). 
Casting employed mothers in such a light was 
obviously meant to generate public outrage and 
gain support for restrictions of their employment. 
The economists' prescriptions were 
outright punitive. Jevons stated: "I will go so far as 
to advocate the ultimate complete exclusion of 
mothers of children under the age of three years 
from factories and workshops" (1904: 167-8, 
emphasis in text). He proposed to fine the husbands 
and employers of the derelict mothers, as well as 
the nurses. Mothers were not treated as responsible 
agents. Instead, they were patronized, and 
economists attempted to reinforce their dependency 
by making their husbands and employers answer 
fortheir actions. Pigou and Marshall also advocated 
the prohibition of employment for mothers. But, 
while Marshall showed no concern for how this 
might affect the income of working-class 
households and women's ability to feed their 
children, Pigou proposed some form of state-
funded "relief to those families whom the 
prohibition renders necessitous" (1960, 188). 
The argument about mothers' nurturing 
instinct (although it was found lacking by 
economists) and of the special value of their 
reproductive work towards their own children was 
used to reject all other solutions, particularly that of 
day nurseries which could provide adequate 
childcare (Jevons 1904, 164-5). While he 
acknowledged that factory-supervised creches 
observed in France "have produced most beneficial 
results," Jevons supported the idea only as a 
transitional measure for the period of adjustment to 
the new regime of employment prohibition. As for 
relief, it was to be provided only to "widows and 
deserted wives" to be "employed" by the state "as 
nurses to their own children" (169). Hence a sexual 
division of labour which served patriarchal 
interests and kept women in the domestic sphere, 
without access to an independent income source 
was assumed as "natural." As an element of nature 
it could then become the "logical" basis for policy 
prescriptions. 
Whereas the proposed policy of 
prohibition of employment targeted specifically the 
mothers of young children, the economists cast a 
wider net to ensure the domestification of women 
in general. In particular, they uniformly supported 
the Factory Acts - Jevons praised them as "one of 
the noblest products of legislative skill and 
patience" at the end of his article on "Married 
Women in Factories" (172). The status quo of 
below-subsistence wages was also seen as inducing 
domesticity among women in general. Marshall 
explicitly opposed a rise of women's wages which 
he claimed to be detrimental to the performance of 
their domestic duties (1930, 685). More generally, 
Marshall, Pigou and Edgeworth's opposition to 
equal pay, to minimum wages for women, to access 
to industrial training all intended to keep women 
dependent and domestified. 
The strange paradox is that women do not 
seem to want to do what is claimed to be "natural" 
for them; they have to be coerced on to that path. In 
the name of their "natural duties," women were 
kept away from making their own decisions. Severe 
legislation to keep them in the home was proposed 
as the panacea for the "evil" of infant mortality. 
Jevons evoked idyllic images of "the wife ... a true 
mother and a housekeeper; and round many a 
Christmas table troops of happy chubby children" 
which will miraculously appear once the legislator 
speeds up what he saw as a process of evolution 
whereby "the manufacturing population would 
become fitted to its environment" (1904, 171-2). 
Meanwhile, as working-class women were to be 
coerced into the dependent reproductive role, their 
economic contribution to their family and to society 
as a whole was to be further denied and made 
invisible: their work, although seemingly essential 
would receive no economic return or recognition." 
Contemporary neoclassical economists 
reveal an intimate commitment to nineteenth-
century patriarchal ideology by their continued 
reliance upon the assumption that women are 
naturally suited for reproductive work. The New 
Home Economics takes this further and insists that 
women have a "comparative advantage" in the 
performance of mothering and household duties. 
Not only does this "scientific reasoning" reinforce 
the dominant sexual division of labour within the 
home and in society, it also bolsters the human 
capital school's circular explanation of women's 
lower wages: since women earn less than men, it is 
to their advantage and the advantage of their 
families for them to remain specialized in 
reproductive work. Women's assumed 
"comparative advantage" in nurturing is used to 
privilege their contribution to the human capital of 
others (husband, children) over maximizing returns 
to their own human capital (Becker 1973, 1976, 
1981; Mincer and Polachek 1974; Schultz 1974). 
A l l this fails to address the reality of 
women's "double workday" and the oddity of the 
lack of monetary return for the activities in which 
women have a "comparative advantage." We can 
see that, in spite of greater sophistication and more 
complex mathematical expression, very little 
change in either assumptions or reasoning has 
occurred since Marshall. Now, as then, this 
economic "logic" tends to justify and maintain a 
status quo of female dependence, domesticity and 
"specialization" in reproductive work. 
Fern inists of the first wave of the women's 
movement opposed the existing barriers to 
women's access to the labour market. They 
denounced the Factory Acts (Bodichon 1859; Mi l l 
1965,1970; Strachey 1969; Taylor 1970) as well as 
trade boards and trade union restrictions on 
women's entry and access to skills and 
apprenticeship (Fawcett 1892, 1916, 1918; Webb 
1914, 1919). However, in the feminist economic 
writings I have studied, I did not find anyone 
directly taking on the infant mortality argument of 
the neoclassical economists. But, as I have already 
mentioned, a number of studies documented the 
extent of income-earning support generated by 
working women.1 4 
Eleanor Rathbone, however, focussed 
specifically on the economic position of working-
class mothers in England post World War I. She 
criticized the ideologies of the "family wage" and 
of the male breadwinner as utterly flawed 
representations of the income-earning reality of 
working-class households and as an inadequate 
income distribution system (1917, 62). She 
developed a proposal for a "motherhood 
allowance" where mothers would receive from the 
state an independent income to provide for the 
subsistence needs of their children. Whereas she 
supported the position that mothers should stay 
home to take care of their children, she maintained 
that their reproductive work must receive the 
economic recognition of a specific income 
payment. She rejected the situation where mothers 
were the dependent victims of a patriarchal order. 
Her mother's allowance system proposed to provide 
mothers with an independent, state-funded income, 
to recognize their role and their work in the 
household and to generate economic support for 
children independent of the sometimes uncertain 
labour market earnings of men. 
The economists of the time did not 
sanction Rathbone's proposals. As already 
mentioned, Pigou endorsed state allowances only 
in the case of widows, with the express purpose of 
maintaining them domesticated and dependent on 
the state. He did not favour schemes which would 
economically recognize mothers' reproductive work 
while ensuring them access to an independent 
income. Edgeworth opposed motherhood 
allowances after applying a strict economic 
cost/benefit analysis to them (1922,450-3) and was 
not willing to recognize that, in a wider social 
welfare approach, the balance might tip in their 
favour (1923, 494).1 5 
Productivity 
The fourth assumption, that of women's 
low industrial productivity, is pervasive in the early 
(and late) neoclassical economists' writings. For 
instance, women were repetitively characterized as 
unskilled and "low grade workers" by Pigou (1960: 
607,723). Pigou never demonstrated this and never 
stopped to wonder about employers' continued 
demand for women's labour, particularly in specific 
"women's" industries.16 The argument that women 
receive low wages as a result of low productivity is 
also reinforced by the assumption of perfect 
competition in the labour market. Given this 
assumption, women's low wages are seen as 
"proof of their low productivity. Yet the absence 
of a necessary correlation between women's wages 
and productivity is paradoxically confirmed by 
Pigou. He argued that women's wages should be 
pegged at a presumably "fair" market-determined 
level even when their productivity should warrant 
a higher wage (Pigou 1960, 566-70).17 
The views of neoclassical economists were 
contradicted in their days by the more realistic 
observations and theories of first wave feminists. 
Fawcett (1892, 1916) and Mi l l (1965) put forward 
a theory of non-competing groups which provided 
an alternative to the neoclassical unified labour 
market. The concept of crowding, which has today 
become an accepted approach to labour markets, 
was first developed by Bodichon (1859), Fawcett 
(1892, 1916), Smart (1892), Cannan (1914) and 
Beatrice Webb (1914, 1919). As early as 1859, 
Bodichon identified institutional and customary 
barriers to women's entry into industry. This 
analysis was refined by Mi l l (1965, 1970), Fawcett 
(1892, 1916) and Webb (1914, 1919). Others 
developed a "customary wage" approach whereby 
customs and tradition were greater determinants of 
women's wages than actual productivity (Marshall 
and Marshall 1881; Smart 1892). Discrimination 
between the sexes in the form of a dual system of 
women's subsistence wage and men's "family 
wage" was another approach proposed by Smart 
(1892), Rathbone (1917, 1924) and Webb (1914, 
1919). William Smart's 1892 comprehensive and 
incisive critique of the economists' use of the law 
of demand and supply to justify women's low 
wages is just as relevant today and testifies to the 
ossification of the discipline.'8 
It is interesting to see how the biases of 
the neoclassical economists were reasserted in spite 
of these other approaches and in spite of their own 
acknowledgment of less than competitive 
conditions in the labour market. Edgeworth listed 
three reasons why the labour market is not 
competitive: employers' power, their preference for 
hiring men even at a productivity disadvantage, 
and trade unions' interference (1922, 439). Yet he 
asserted "I submit as an inference based on general 
impressions and ordinary experience that, even if 
all restrictions on the competition between male 
and female workers were removed we should still 
find the average weekly earnings of the former to 
be considerably higher" (1922, 442, emphasis 
added). Here, against all precepts of positivist 
science, assertion prevails over evidence and proof. 
Pigou's suggestions on the problem of 
non-competing markets for women workers was to 
keep them such. In contrast, where men receive 
wages below the value of their marginal product 
Pigou recommended state intervention to raise 
these wages to their efficiency level. No such 
solution was proposed in the case of women, as 
their wages were decreed "fair" if they 
corresponded to what women were "paid 
elsewhere," regardless of their actual productivity 
level (1960, 569-70). Pigou forgot his usual 
efficiency concerns and used instead the apparently 
solicitous argument that higher wages would deter 
employers from hiring women and thus harm 
women's position in the labour market. Reading on, 
we find out, however, that he was a lot more 
concerned with employers' access to a supply of 
cheap female labour than with women's 
employment opportunities (600-02). 
The belief that women have low industrial 
productivity did not lead to proposals to raise 
productivity levels via either training or education. 
The neoclassical economists saw such schemes as 
wasteful since they believed that women should not 
remain in the labour force, that their dependent 
status removed all motivation for productivity 
improvement, or that women's unproductivity is 
irremediable (Pigou 1960, 616). In a nutshell, any 
proposal to improve women's wage-earning 
capacity, whether through increased skills and 
training, through wages reflecting more adequately 
women's actual productivity, or through equal pay 
(and in some cases minimum wages) measures, 
were opposed (Edgeworth 1922,1923; Pigou 1960, 
1952; Marshall 1930: 715). 
Such measures were seen as harmful to the 
market, to employers, and to overall economic 
welfare. Edgeworth believed they could cause a 
"debacle of industry," or worse, men's rights to jobs 
and their status as breadwinners might be 
challenged (Edgeworth 1922, 1923). Pigou saw 
such measures as threatening to harm general 
welfare by "divert[ing] women into industrial 
activity away from home-making, child-rearing and 
child-bearing" (1952, 224-5) and as unnecessary 
because women do not need higher labour income, 
being dependents and only temporarily present in 
the labour market. 
Once again we see direct parallels with 
contemporary human capital theory: the market is 
assumed to be both perfect and infallible in its 
determination of wages which truly reflect 
productivity; women's lower employment income 
is therefore attributed to their own choice in human 
capital investment and choice of low-productivity 
occupations. Any legislative approach (pay 
equity/comparable worth, affirmative action) will 
only create market imperfections and jeopardize 
women's chances in the labour market 
(Killingsworth 1985). 
These positions are directly opposed to 
feminist analysis of women's labour force situation 
and to f e m i n i s t e c o n o m i c p o l i c y 
recommendations.19 What is so striking is the 
neoclassical economists' heavy reliance on their 
patriarchal bias rather than on theoretically and 
methodologically sound approaches to support 
their policy recommendations. The pervasiveness 
of this bias raises the question of whether feminist 
ideas and approaches can ever gain a place within 
the paradigm. To date, feminist critiques of human 
capital theory and of the New Home Economics 
have largely been ignored. 
Rationality 
The four assumptions/characterizations 
discussed above are closely linked. They reinforce 
each other and contribute to a specific construction 
of women by the early neoclassical economists. 
Through their combined effects (in theory and 
policy) women are seen as occupying a radically 
different place in the capitalist economy than men, 
who are conversely constructed as "rational 
economic men."2 0 
In neoclassical economics, men are 
autonomous, independent individuals, while 
women are dependents who cannot stand on their 
own. Women are always defined as members of 
family units, as wives, daughters, mothers. Men 
make economic decisions based on their own needs 
and their own abilities and options; they circulate 
freely in the market sphere. In contrast, women 
have limited access to the market and even more 
limited access to their own utility maximizing 
decision-making. Even in the single example 
Marshall uses where women are seen to skilfully 
exercise such decision-making, by stretching (i.e. 
"maximizing the allocation" of) the meagre 
household budget21 (1930, 195-6), it is not their 
own utility which is maximized, but that of the 
household.22 Where men may choose across an 
array of occupations, women are assigned to a 
single one: motherhood. 
In this construction, women lack access to 
the conditions required to act freely and rationally 
in the capitalist marketplace. The complete absence 
of these conditions for women is mirrored in the 
monopoly exerted over them by men - a means 
through which the masculinity of homoeconomicus 
is erected. Women's condition is closest to that of 
the pre-capitalist serfs or slaves whose lives are 
determined and whose decisions are made by 
someone else: husband, father, guardian. Isn't this 
why Jevons proposes to fine husbands when 
women break the law? 2 3 
But are women's economic actions really 
so different? Don't they seek employment to 
support themselves and their families? Don't they 
respond to the economic incentive of starvation and 
poverty (their own and their children's) by seeking 
employment? And don't they try to make the best 
of the limited opportunities offered by the labour 
market? But, given the misogyny of neoclassical 
economists, we are not surprised to see women 
blamed for competing against each other and 
driving down their own wages (are men ever 
chastised for competing against each other?). 
Viewed from a feminist standpoint, it is obvious 
that women's behaviour is rational despite the 
incredible restrictions they continue to face. 
Women are seen as irrational, not because 
they act against the laws of economic rationality, 
but because they are not allowed to act rationally, 
or because they act in contravention of the roles 
that are prescribed as "natural" for them. Taking 
this further, it seems that women's access to 
economic rationality is perceived as a threat to the 
economy and to society. Marshall, Jevons, 
Edgeworth and Pigou share this view, and it leads 
them to oppose systematically attempts by women 
to claim an equal economic status and to create for 
themselves the conditions for that status. 
Conclusion 
Approaches to women in neoclassical 
economics have not changed much since the 
founding of the paradigm in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. The men who wrote then and 
the many men and women who write from this 
perspective today share a common commitment to 
a methodology which is imbued with patriarchy, 
sexism and misogyny. As in the early days, women 
and feminists are excluded from developing or 
establishing alternative theoretical approaches. Our 
words are not heard within the "malestream" of the 
discipline. Can neoclassical economics be cleansed 
of its patriarchal bias so that it can open its eyes to 
the methodological flaws resulting from its 
ingrained sexism? With the authors of other papers 
in this collection, I want to suggest that the very 
logic, rhetoric and symbolism of the paradigm may 
be inseparable from the five sexist assumptions I 
have discussed here. Neoclassical economics has a 
history of stifling feminist approaches. We cannot 
wait for it to change. We must transcend it. 
Michele Pujol 
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ENDNOTES 
1. On standpoint theory see in particular Nancy Hartsock 
(1983, 1991). 
2. Just as your experiences and identity shape your analyses. 
3. I will focus on the following early neoclassical works: A. 
Marshall's Principles of Economics (1930), S. Jevons' 1904 
article "Married Women in Factories," A C . Pigou's Economics 
of Welfare (1960) and F. Edgeworth's two articles "Equal Pay 
to Men and Women for Equal Work" (1922) and "Women's 
Wages in Relation to Economic Welfare" (1923). 
4. This goes back to the origins of patriarchal thought: 
Elizabeth Spelman, in Inessential Woman, discusses how, for 
Aristotle, women were acknowledged only if they were wives 
of citizens. All other women simply did not exist (1988,45-7). 
5. Their only worry is where it is deemed insufficient: e.g. in 
discussions of the Poor Rates impact on the (male) supply of 
labour. 
6. See Pigou's discussion of unfair wages (1960. 549-70). 
7. Widows - with children - are the only women not dependent 
on a male breadwinner who have elicited some interest. Pigou 
specifically devises state welfare schemes to keep them away 
from the labour force, staying home to reproduce the next 
generation, and to keep them economically dependent - on the 
state (1960, 722-3). 
8. In the Cambridge degree controversy, the argument used by 
Marshall to oppose women's admissions was his belief that 
most (90 percent) female students would marry and 
consequently not require the economic independence provided 
by a degree. On the opposite side of the controversy, E M . 
Sidgwick documented, in a statistical study of families from 
which students would be drawn, that the marriage rate would be 
under 50 percent (McWilliams Tullberg 1992, 24). 
9. On the "family wage," see also Land (1979-80) and Barrett 
and Mcintosh (1980). 
10. Two studies by Smith (1915) and Hogg (1921) show a high 
rate of self-support among women workers (85 percent in 
Smith's study), and additionally they show that one in three 
working women fully or partially supported dependents besides 
themselves. By contrast, Rowntree-Seebohm and Stuart (1921) 
found that only 12 percent of working women supported 
dependents. The latter, in spite of its dubious methodology, was 
used by Edgeworth to dismiss women's contribution. 
11. Note that Edgeworth's reply to the feminists in 1923 does 
not contradict this analysis, but instead reasserts men's rights in 
the labour force as a rationale for unequal pay. 
12. This position is by no means unique to the early 
neoclassical economists. We find it expressed by the feminist 
Mill (1965, 1970) who argued against married women's 
employment, and by Marx (1967) and Engels (1968) who saw 
the employment of married women as harmful to the living 
conditions and the autonomy of the working class. 
13. Both Marshall (1930: 79-80, 524) and Pigou (1960, 32-3) 
prescribe the outright and unjustified exclusion of women's 
contribution from national income accounts (see Folbre 1991: 
Pujol 1992). 
14. Similarly, today feminist studies point out how much worse 
poverty statistics would be without women's income 
contribution. 
15. Interestingly, one of Edgeworth's arguments in favourofthe 
status quo is the "seriously deleterious" effect that "rel ieving the 
average house-father from the necessity of providing 
necessaries for his family ... would remove a great part of his 
incentive to work" (1922, 453). It becomes clear, here, that 
constraining women to economic dependence on their husbands 
provides the further economic benefit to the nation (to capital) 
of increasing and stabilizing the male supply of labour. 
16. This contradiction was acknowledged by Edgeworth (1922. 
437). 
17. See Pujol (1992) for a more detailed analysis of the 
approaches of Marshall, Edgeworth and Pigou to the issue of 
women's productivity and wages. 
18. With thanks to Susan Feiner for this assessment. 
19. See, for instance, Hartmann (1976), Phillips and Taylor 
(1980), Treiman and Hartmann (1981), England (1982), 
Bergmann (1986), Blau and Ferber (1986), Folbre and 
Hartmann (1988), Waring (1988), Ferber and Nelson (1993). 
20. An important element of the different construction of 
women and men by the neoclassical economists lies in their 
assigned relationship to the market. See Grapard (1993) and 
Hewitson (1993). 
21. Curiously, this is the only instance where women are 
allowed access to training (in home economics). 
22. Here, we can see the close connection between the early 
neoclassical economists and the New Home Economics. 
23. For a full discussion of these dichotomies, see Folbre and 
Hartmann (1988), McCrate (1991) and Nelson (1992, 1993). 
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MICHELE PUJOL: 
WAYS FOR WOMEN TO BE 
A long-legged girl with beautiful brown 
eyes looks thoughtfully out of the photograph taken 
of Michele Pujol when she was a teenager living 
with her parents in Tahiti. Those eyes look out at 
me now in the last photograph I have of her, 
standing with her partner Brook outside the cabin 
on Salt Spring Island where Michele died eleven 
weeks later on August 2, 1997. 
Anyone who ever has worked with 
Michele knows her integrity, her fierce loyalties, 
her meticulous and beautiful mind, her unrelenting 
solidarities with those who struggle for justice, and 
her ability to oppose critically and energetically 
what she regarded as wrong or inadequate. I have 
felt both her opposition and her support, and the 
extraordinary clarity behind each. I remember her 
as my colleague, at a time when I didn't think I 
would have any. 
We both loved our work: she, a feminist 
economist, and I, a feminist literary scholar. And 
the work we shared in developing Women's Studies 
was to make our other loves possible, to make our 
lives possible, to make so much more possible to 
the lives of women. Michele's vision was an active 
and activist praxis, a focussing of critical 
consciousness on practical activities. There was 
nothing outside her discerning and demanding 
feminism, including the relations among women. 
She would show up with organic foods, seek out 
and support women and men estranged in our 
communities, weed an old lot, carry water from the 
river to sun-wilted plants, and embrace the 
opportunities to learn from other cultures. Her 
vision included a steady tenderness for gardens, for 
other people's children, for friends, for the beauties 
created around us and by us, and for those who did 
that creating in daily activities, politics and the arts. 
When I met Michele on the stairs at the 
University of Manitoba, she asked in her direct way 
if I was a real appointment or just term, and nodded 
at my reply. That was in 1984, and she had been 
here two years, teaching in Economics and 
Women's Studies. Imagine my surprise to find a 
feminist and an out lesbian, not undercover at the 
university, but engaging the people and structures 
there as directly as she had spoken to me. Right 
away, I knew lesbian and feminist were lovely ways 
for women to be. 
From 1984 to 1988, Michele coordinated 
Women's Studies, bringing in the Major and 
wresting from the university the economic basis for 
the Program. Michele researched the position of 
women in the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Manitoba, contributed to the proposal for the Prairie 
Endowed Chair in Women's Studies, signed the 
Human Rights Complaints against Manitoba 
universities for systemic discrimination against all 
women, and refused to separate academic Women's 
Studies from activist community participation. I 
remember her clear voice in one Women's Studies 
Committee meeting where we were being asked for 
a small contribution for a community-organized 
Lesbian Issues Conference. To the objection to 
funding a conference that was not academic, 
Michele pointed out that lesbians experienced 
discrimination in our own Women's Studies classes 
and that the work to change that discrimination was 
being done in the community. So a pittance from 
